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Abstract
The Dirichlet process (DP) is one of the most popular Bayesian nonparametric models. An
open problem with the DP is how to choose its infinite-dimensional parameter (base measure)
in case of lack of prior information. In this work we present the Imprecise DP (IDP)—a prior
near-ignorance DP-based model that does not require any choice of this probability measure.
It consists of a class of DPs obtained by letting the normalized base measure of the DP vary
in the set of all probability measures. We discuss the tight connections of this approach with
Bayesian robustness and in particular prior near-ignorance modeling via sets of probabilities.
We use this model to perform a Bayesian hypothesis test on the probability P(X ≤Y ). We study
the theoretical properties of the IDP test (e.g., asymptotic consistency), and compare it with the
frequentist Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank test that is commonly employed as a test on P(X ≤Y ).
In particular we will show that our method is more robust, in the sense that it is able to isolate
instances in which the aforementioned test is virtually guessing at random.
Keywords: Bayesian nonparametric test, Imprecise Dirichlet Process, Wilcoxon rank sum.
1. Introduction
The Dirichlet process (DP) is one of the most popular Bayesian nonparametric models. It
was introduced by Ferguson (1973) as a prior over probability distributions. In his seminal paper,
Ferguson showed that the DP leads to tractable posterior inferences and can be used for Bayesian
analysis of several nonparametric models, such as the estimation of a distribution function, of a
mean, of quantiles, of a variance, etc. He also considered the estimation of P(X ≤ Y ) assigning
independent Dirichlet process priors to the distribution functions of X and Y . The Mann-Whitney
statistic naturally arises in this case. Susarla and Van Ryzin (1976) and Blum and Susarla (1977)
extended the results of Ferguson on estimation of the distribution function in case of right cen-
sored data obtaining a Bayesian version of the Kaplan-Meier estimator. Dalal and Phadia (1983)
considered the problem of estimating a measure of dependence for a bivariate distribution. The
Bayes estimate is computed using a two-dimension Dirichlet prior and Kendall’s tau is seen to
appear naturally. A review of other similar applications of the DP can be found in (Phadia, 2013).
The beauty of the DP is that most of these results are in closed form and that it provides a
Bayesian justification of the classic nonparametric estimators. In spite of all these nice properties
and of the promising initial outcomes, it is a matter of fact that such a research has not resulted
in the development of DP-based Bayesian nonparametric procedures for hypothesis testing. For
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2instance, the most used statistical packages for DP-based Bayesian nonparametric modeling,
“DPpackage” (Jara et al., 2011) and “Bayesm” (Rossi and McCulloch, 2010), include proce-
dures for density estimation, clustering and regression, but do not include any Bayesian version
of the Wilcoxon rank sum, Wilcoxon sign test or other classic nonparametric tests.
It is arguable that this absence may be related to the unsettled question of how to choose
the prior “parameters” of the DP in case of lack of prior information. It is well known in fact
that a DP is completely characterized by its prior “parameters”: the prior strength (or precision),
which is a positive scalar number, and the normalized base measure. How should we choose
these prior “parameters” in case of lack of prior information? The only solution to this problem
that has been proposed so far, first by Ferguson (1973) and then by Rubin (1981) under the name
of Bayesian Bootstrap (BB), is the limiting DP obtained when the prior strength goes to zero.
But the BB model has faced quite some controversy, since it is not actually noninformative and
moreover it assigns zero posterior probability to any set that does not include the observations.
We will discuss these two points with more details in Section 3.
In this paper we present an alternative viewpoint to the problem of choosing the prior base
measure of the DP in case of lack of prior information that overcomes the above drawbacks of
the BB. The model we present generalizes to nonparametrics earlier ideas developed in Bayesian
parametric robustness, see Berger (1994) and Berger et al. (2000) for a review. Here lack of prior
information is expressed in terms of a family T consisting of all prior probability measures that
are compatible with the available prior information. Inferences are then carried out by consider-
ing the whole family T . In case almost no prior information is available on the parameters of
interest, T should be as large as possible in order to describe this state of prior ignorance. The
natural candidate for T to represent complete ignorance is the set of all probability measures.
However, it turns out that the posterior inferences obtained from this set are vacuous (Walley,
1991, Sec. 7.3.7), i.e., the posterior set coincides with the prior set. This means that that there
is no learning from data. Therefore, the vacuous prior model is not a statistically useful way to
model our prior ignorance. There is then a compromise to be made. Pericchi and Walley (1991)
and Walley (1991) suggest, as an alternative, the use of an almost vacuous model which they
call “near-ignorance” or “imprecise” model. This is a model that behaves a priori as a vacuous
model for some basic inferences (e.g., prior mean, prior credible regions) but it always provides
non-vacuous posterior inferences.
While Bayesian robust models have already been extended to the nonparametric setting
(Ruggeri, 2010), that has not been the case for near-ignorance models.1 The main aim of this
paper is to derive a prior near-ignorance DP, called Imprecise DP (IDP). This is the class T of all
DPs obtained by fixing the prior strength of the DP and letting the normalized base measure vary
in the set of all probability measures. We will show that the IDP behaves a priori as a vacuous
model for all predictive inferences. This, together with the fact that it is a nonparametric model,
allows us to start a statistical analysis with very weak assumptions about the problem of interest.
However, contrarily to a full vacuous model, we will show that the IDP can learn from data.
Moreover, we will employ the IDP to develop a new Bayesian nonparametric hypothesis
test on the probability that X ≤ Y ; we will call this test IDP rank-sum test, due to its similarity
with the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) rank-sum test. This hypothesis test is widely ap-
plied; for instance, if X and Y are health status measures in a clinical trial, P(X ≤ Y ) is, roughly
1A nonparametric model that uses lower and upper bounds for probabilities to quantify uncertainty has been proposed
by Augustin and Coolen (2004); Coolen and Augustin (2009). This model is a purely predictive model, based on post-
data assumptions, and, thus, it cannot be used straightforwardly to perform hypothesis tests.
3speaking, the probability that the treatment represented by Y is better (not worse) than the treat-
ment represented by X . A Bayesian nonparametric near-ignorance model presents several ad-
vantages with respect to a traditional approach to hypothesis testing. First of all, the Bayesian
approach allows us to formulate the hypothesis test as a decision problem. This means that we
can verify the evidence in favor of the null hypothesis and not only rejecting it, as well as take
decisions that minimize the expected loss. Second, because of the nonparametric near-ignorance
prior, the IDP rank-sum test allows us to start the hypothesis test with very weak prior assump-
tions, much in the direction of letting data speak for themselves. From a computational point of
view, we will show that posterior inferences from the IDP can be derived by computing lower
and upper bounds of expectations w.r.t. the class of DPs T and that, for some inference, these
lower and upper bounds can be computed in closed-form (e.g., mean and variance of P(X ≤Y )).
When no closed form expression exists, these bounds can be computed by a simple Monte Carlo
sampling from two Dirichlet distributions. This means that we do not need to use stick breaking
or other sampling approaches specific for DP. This computational advantage comes for free from
prior near-ignorance.
In our view, the IDP rank-sum test appears to be a natural way to complete the work of
Ferguson (1973), who first showed the connection between the expectation of P(X ≤ Y ) w.r.t.
the DP and the Mann-Whitney statistic: it develops a Bayesian nonparametric near-ignorance-
prior test for the probability that X ≤Y , which is computationally efficient and that, also for this
reason, provides an effective practical alternative to the MWW test.
Note that, although the IDP test shares several similarities with a standard Bayesian ap-
proach, at the same time it embodies a significant change of paradigm when it comes to take
decisions. In fact the IDP rank-sum test has the advantage of producing an indeterminate out-
come when the decision is prior-dependent. In other words, the IDP test suspends the judgment
(which can be translated as “I do not know whether Y is better than X”) when the option that
minimizes the expected loss changes depending on the DP base measure we focus on. There-
fore, the IDP-based test is robust in the sense that it provides a determinate decision only when
all the DPs, in the class the IDP represents, agree on the same decision. We will show that the
number of indeterminate instances decreases at the accumulation of evidence and thus that the
IDP-based test is always asymptotically consistent for P(X ≤ Y ). This is not always true for the
MWW test, even though the MWW test is commonly employed as a test about P(X ≤ Y ).
Finally, we will compare our IDP test with the MWW test and the DP-based test obtained
as the prior strength goes to zero (called BB-DP test). We empirically show on several different
case studies that when the IDP test is indeterminate, the MWW and BB-IDP tests are virtually
behaving as random guessers. For a sample size of 20 observations, the percentage of these
instances can arrive up to almost 20%. We regard this surprising result as an important finding,
with practical consequences in hypothesis testing. Assume that we are trying to compare the
effects of two medical treatments (“Y is better than X”) and that, given the available data, the
IDP test is indeterminate. In such a situation the MWW test (or the BB-IDP test) always issues
a determinate response (for instance, “I can tell that Y is better than X”), but it turns out that its
response is completely random, like if we were tossing a coin. In these cases by using MWW
we would choose treatment Y , but this decision would be based on a random guess. In fact in
these instances the MWW test could return the other hypothesis (“it is not true that Y is better
than X”) with equal probability. On the other side, the IDP test acknowledges the impossibility
of making a decision in these cases. Thus, by saying “I do not know”, the IDP test provides a
richer information to the analyst. The analyst could for instance use this information to collect
4more data. (Please note that R and Matlab codes of our IDP rank-sum test are freely available at
http://ipg.idsia.ch/software/IDP.php.)
2. Dirichlet process
The Dirichlet process was developed by Ferguson (1973) as a probability distribution on
the space of probability distributions. Let X be a standard Borel space with Borel σ -field BX
and P be the space of probability measures on (X,BX) equipped with the weak topology and
the corresponding Borel σ -field BP. Let M be the class of all probability measures on (P,BP).
We call the elements µ ∈M nonparametric priors.
An element of M is called a Dirichlet process distribution D(α) with base measure α if for
every finite measurable partition B1, . . . ,Bm of X, the vector (P(B1), . . . ,P(Bm)) has a Dirichlet
distribution with parameters (α(B1), . . . ,α(Bm)), where α(·) is a finite positive Borel measure
on X. Consider the partition B1 = A and B2 = Ac = X\A for some measurable set A ∈X, then if
P∼D(α) from the definition of the DP we have that (P(A),P(Ac))∼Dir(α(A),α(X)−α(A)),
which is a Beta distribution. From the moments of the Beta distribution, we can thus derive that:
E [P(A)] =
α(A)
α(X)
, E [(P(A)−E [P(A)])2] = α(A)(α(X)−α(A))
(α(X)2(α(X)+ 1)) , (1)
where we have used the calligraphic letter E to denote expectation w.r.t. the Dirichlet process.
This shows that the normalized measure α(·)/α(X) of the DP reflects the prior expectation of
P, while the scaling parameter α(X) controls how much P is allowed to deviate from its mean
α(·)/α(X). Let s = α(X) stand for the total mass of α(·) and α∗(·) = α(·)/s stand for the
probability measure obtained by normalizing α(·). If P ∼ D(α), we shall also describe this
by saying P ∼ Dp(s,α∗) or, if X = R, P ∼ Dp(s,G0), where G0 stands for the cumulative
distribution function of α∗.
Let P ∼ Dp(s,α∗) and f be a real-valued bounded function defined on (X,B). Then the
expectation with respect to the Dirichlet process of E[ f ] is
E
[
E( f )]= E [∫ f dP]= ∫ f dE [P] = ∫ f dα∗. (2)
One of the most remarkable properties of the DP priors is that the posterior distribution of P
is again a DP. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be an independent and identically distributed sample from P and
P∼ Dp(s,α∗), then the posterior distribution of P given the observations is
P|X1, . . . ,Xn ∼ Dp
(
s+ n,
s
s+ n
α∗+
1
s+ n
n
∑
i=1
δXi
)
, (3)
where δXi is an atomic probability measure centered at Xi. This means that the Dirichlet pro-
cess satisfies a property of conjugacy, in the sense that the posterior for P is again a Dirichlet
process with updated unnormalized base measure α +∑ni=1 δXi . From (3) and (1)–(2), we can
easily derive the posterior mean and variance of P(A) and, respectively, posterior expectation
of f . Hereafter we list some useful properties of the DP that will be used in the sequel (see
Ghosh and Ramamoorthi (2003, Ch. 3)).
5(a) In case X = R, since P is completely defined by its cumulative distribution function F ,
a-priori we say F ∼ Dp(s,G0) and a posteriori we can rewrite (3) as follows:
F |X1, . . . ,Xn ∼ Dp
(
s+ n,
s
s+ n
G0 +
1
s+ n
n
∑
i=1
I[Xi,∞)
)
, (4)
where I is the indicator function.
(b) Consider an element µ ∈M which puts all its mass at the probability measure P = δx for
some x ∈X. This can also be modeled as Dp(s,δx) for each s > 0.
(c) Assume that P1 ∼ Dp(s1,α∗1 ), P2 ∼ Dp(s2,α∗2 ), (w1,w2) ∼ Dir(s1,s2) and P1, P2, (w1,w2)
are independent, then (Ghosh and Ramamoorthi, 2003, Sec. 3.1.1):
w1P1 +w2P2 ∼ Dp
(
s1 + s2,
s1
s1 + s2
α∗1 +
s2
s1 + s2
α∗2
)
. (5)
(d) Let Px have distribution Dp(s+ n, ss+n α∗+ 1s+n ∑ni=1 δXi). We can write
Px = w0P+
n
∑
i=1
wiδXi , (6)
where (w0,w1, . . . ,wn)∼ Dir(s,1, . . . ,1) and P ∼Dp(s,α∗) (it follows by (b)-(c)).
3. Prior ignorance
How should we choose the prior parameters (s,α∗) of the DP, in particular the infinite-
dimensional α∗, in case of lack of prior information? To address this issue, the only prior that
has been proposed so far is the limiting DP obtained for s → 0, which has been introduced
under the name of Bayesian Bootstrap (BB) by Rubin (1981); in fact it can be proven that the
BB is asymptotically equivalent (see Lo (1987) and Weng (1989)) to the frequentist bootstrap
introduced by Efron (1979).
The BB has been criticized on diverse grounds. From an a-priori point of view, the main
criticism is that taking s→ 0 is far from leading to a noninformative prior. Sethuraman and Tiwari
(1981) have shown that for s → 0 a measure sampled from the DP is a degenerated (atomic)
measure centered on X0, with X0 distributed according to α∗. As a further consequence, from an
a-posteriori point of view, this choice for the prior gives zero probability to the event that a future
observation is different from the previously observed data. Rubin (1981) reports the following
extreme example. Consider the probability that X >C where C is a value larger than the largest
observed value of X , i.e., X(n). The standard BB and bootstrap methods estimate such probabil-
ity to be 0 with zero variance, which is untenable if X can assume different values from the n
previously observed. Rubin also remarks that one should expect a probability that X is greater
than or equal to X(n) of about 1/(n+ 1). This shows that a Dirichlet prior with s → 0 implies
definitely a very strong (and not always reasonable) information about P, and hence it cannot be
considered a noninformative prior. On the other side, if we choose a DP prior with s > 0, the
inferences provided by this model will be sensitive to the choice of the normalized measure α∗.
If, for example, we decide to assign a “tail” probability of 1/(n+ 1) to X > X(n), in agreement
6with Rubin’s intuition, the inferences will be different if we assume that the tail probability is
concentrated on X(n) or if we assume that it is spread from X(n) to a very large value of X .
To answer to the initial question of this section, we propose the imprecise Dirichlet process
(IDP). The main characteristic of the IDP is that it does not require any choice of the normalized
measure α∗, it is a prior near-ignorance model and solves the issues of the BB. Before introduc-
ing the IDP, it is worth to explain what is a prior near-ignorance model with the example of a
parametric model (Walley, 1991, Sec. 5.3.1).
Example 1. Let A be the event that a particular thumbtack lands pin-up at the next toss. Your
information is that there have been m occurrences of pin up in n previous tosses. Using a
Bernoulli model, the likelihood function generated by observing m successes in n trials is then
proportional to θ n(1−θ )n−m where θ is the chance of pin-up. To complete the model, we need
to specify prior beliefs concerning the unknown chance θ . We can use a conjugate Beta prior
p(θ ) = Be(θ ;α,β ), where α,β > 0 are the prior parameters of the Beta density. A-posteriori
we have that p(θ |m,n) = Be(θ ;α +m,β + n−m). Thus, the prior and posterior probabilities
of A are:
P(A) = E[θ ] = t, P(A|m,n) = E[θ |m,n] = st +m
s+ n
,
where s = α +β is the prior strength and t = α/(α +β ) the prior mean. The problem is how to
choose the parameters s, t in case of lack of prior information. Walley (1991, Ch. 5) proposes to
use a prior near-ignorance model. A near-ignorance prior model for this example is any set of
priors which generates vacuous prior probabilities for the event of interest A, i.e.,
P(A) = 0, P(A) = 1,
where P,P are lower and upper bounds for P(A). These vacuous probabilities reflect a complete
absence of prior information concerning A. For the Beta prior, since P(A) = E[θ ] = t, the class
of priors is simply:
p(θ ) ∈ {Be(θ ;st,s(1− t)) : 0 < t < 1} ,
for some fixed s > 0, i.e., this is the set of priors obtained by considering all the Beta densities
whose mean parameter t is free to span the interval (0,1). Posterior inferences from this model
are derived by computing lower and upper posterior bounds; in the case of event A these bounds
are:
P(A|m,n) = m
s+ n
, P(A|m,n) = s+m
s+ n
,
where the lower is obtained for t → 0 and the upper for t → 1. We point the reader to Walley
(1996) for more details about this model and to Benavoli and Zaffalon (2012) for an extension
of near-ignorance to one-parameter exponential families.
3.1. Imprecise Dirichlet process
Before introducing the IDP, we give a formal definition of (nonparametric) prior ignorance
for predictive inferences. Let f be a real-valued bounded function on X, we call E[ f ] = ∫ f dP
a predictive inference about X ; here P is a probability measure on (X,BX). Let µ ∈M be a
nonparametric prior on P and Eµ [E(P)] the expectation of E[ f ] w.r.t. µ .
Definition 1. A class of nonparametric priors T ⊂M is called a prior ignorance model for
predictive inferences about X, if for any real-valued bounded function f on X it satisfies:
E [E( f )] = inf
µ∈T
Eµ [E( f )] = inf f , E [E( f )] = sup
µ∈T
Eµ [E( f )] = sup f , (7)
7where E [E( f )] and E [E( f )] denote respectively the lower and upper bound of Eµ [E(P)] calcu-
lated w.r.t. the class T .
From (7) it can be observed that the range of Eµ [E( f )] under the class T is the same as the
original range of f . In other words, by specifying the class T , we are not giving any information
on the value of the expectation of f . This means that the class T behaves as a vacuous model.
We are now ready to define the IDP.
Definition 2. IDP. We call prior imprecise DP the following class of DPs:
T = {Dp(s,α∗) : α∗ ∈ P} . (8)
The IDP is the class of DPs obtained for a fixed s > 0 and by letting the normalized measure
α∗ to vary in the set of all probability measures P on (X,BX).
Theorem 1. The IDP is a model of prior ignorance for all predictive inferences about X, i.e.,
for any real-valued bounded function f on X it satisfies:
E [E( f )] = inf f , E [E( f )] = sup f , (9)
where E [E( f )] and E [E( f )] denote respectively the lower and upper bound of E [E( f )] defined
in (2) calculated w.r.t. the class of DPs (8).
The proofs of this and the next theorems are in the Appendix. To show that the IDP is a
model of prior ignorance, consider for instance the indicator function f = IA for some A ⊆ X.
Since E[IA] = P(A), from (2) we have that E [P(A)] =
∫
IAdα∗. Then if we choose α∗ = δxl with
xl /∈ A and, respectively, α∗ = δxu with xu ∈ A:
E [P(A)] =
∫
IAdδxl = min IA = 0, E [P(A)] =
∫
IAdδxu = max IA = 1, (10)
where E [P(A)] and E [P(A)] are the lower and upper bounds for E
[
P(A)
]
. This is a condition
of prior ignorance for P(A), since we are saying that the only information about P(A) is that
0≤ P(A)≤ 1. The lower and upper bounds are obtained from the degenerate DPs Dp(s,δxl ) and
Dp(s,δxu), which belong to the class (8). Note that, although the lower and upper bounds are
obtained by degenerate DPs, to obtain these bounds we are considering all possible Dp(s,α∗)
with α∗ ∈ P (even the ones with continuous probability measures α∗).
Theorem 2. Posterior inference. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be i.i.d. samples from P and P ∼ Dp(s,α∗).
Then for any real-valued bounded function f onX, the lower and upper bounds of E [E( f )|X1, . . . ,Xn]
under the IDP model in (8) are:
E
[
E( f )|X1, . . . ,Xn
]
=
s
s+ n
inf f + n
s+ n
Sn( f ),
E
[
E( f )|X1, . . . ,Xn
]
=
s
s+ n
sup f + n
s+ n
Sn( f ),
(11)
where Sn( f ) = ∑
n
i=1 f (Xi)
n
.
A-posteriori the IDP does not satisfy anymore the prior ignorance property (9). This means
that learning from data takes place under the IDP. In fact let S( f ) be equal to limn→∞ Sn( f ),
a-posteriori for n→ ∞ we have that:
E
[
E( f )|X1, . . . ,Xn
]
,E
[
E( f )|X1, . . . ,Xn
]→ S( f ), (12)
8i.e., the lower and upper bounds of the posterior expectations converge to S( f ), which only
depends on data. In other words, the effect of prior ignorance vanishes asymptotically:
E
[
E( f )|X1, . . . ,Xn
]−E [E( f )|X1, . . . ,Xn]= s
s+ n
(sup f − inf f )→ 0,
for any finite s. To define the IDP, the modeler has only to choose s. This explains the mean-
ing of the adjective near in prior near-ignorance, because the IDP requires by the modeller the
elicitation of a parameter. However, this is a simple elicitation problem for a nonparametric
prior, since we only have to choose the value of a positive scalar (there are not infinitely dimen-
sional parameters left in the IDP model). Section 4 gives some guidelines for the choice of this
parameter.
Observe that IDP solves the two main drawbacks of Bayesian Bootstrap. From the a-priori
point of view, we have shown in (9) that the IDP is a model of prior ignorance for predictive
inferences. Moreover, the prior distributions considered can assign a non-null probability to un-
observed values of X . Then, considering Rubin’s example about the probability that X is greater
than or equal to X(n), which is obtained as the expectation of f = I[C,∞) with C > X(n), from (11)
we have a-posteriori that E
[
E( f )|data]= 0 and E [E( f )|data]= s
s+n . The upper expectation is
greater than zero and, for s= 1, it is equal to 1/(1+n). This result is obtained without specifying
how the probability of 1/(1+ n) is spread between the values X > X(n), and thus it is insensi-
tive to the model specification of tail probabilities. Note that the IDP reduces to the imprecise
Dirichlet model proposed by Walley (1996), see also Bernard (2005); de Cooman et al. (2009)),
when we limit ourselves to consider a finite measurable partition B1, . . . ,Bm of X. In this case,
the set of priors {Dp(s,α∗), α∗ ∈ P}, reduces to a set of Dirichlet distributions with parameters
(sα∗(B1), . . . ,sα∗(Bm)).
4. An application to hypothesis testing
Hypothesis testing is an important application of nonparametric statistics. Recently there
has been an increasing interest in the development of Bayesian nonparametric procedures for
hypothesis testing. For instance Bayesian nonparametric approaches to the two-sample prob-
lem have been proposed using Dirichlet process mixture models or (coupling-optional) Polya
trees priors by Borgwardt and Ghahramani (2009); Holmes et al. (2009); Ma and Wong (2011);
Chen and Hanson (2014). Although prior near-ignorance may also be useful in these models
and in the two-sample problem, we do not follow this avenue in the present study. Our focus
is instead the hypothesis test P(X ≤ Y ) ⋚ P(X > Y ) (equivalently P(X ≤ Y ) ⋚ 0.5), given in-
dependent random samples of sizes n1 and n2 from two populations. This problem arises, for
example, if one wishes to compare the response X of a population with respect to the response Y
of a different population in order to establish whether the two populations perform equally well
or one population has generally “better” responses than the other.
The nonparametric test traditionally applied in such situations is the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
(MWW) rank-sum test. The null hypothesis of the MWW rank-sum test is that the two pop-
ulations are equal, that is, they come from the same distribution FX(x) = FY (x). Let Xn1 =
{X1, . . . ,Xn1} and Y n2 = {Y1, . . . ,Yn2} be two sequences of observations from the two popula-
tions. The MWW test is based on the fact that, if the two populations have the same distribution,
9the distribution of the linear rank statistic
U =
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
I[Xi,∞)(Yj), (13)
can be computed by considering all the possible random arrangements of the observations in Xn1
and Y n2 . At the increase of n1 and n2, this distribution converges to a Normal distribution with
mean and variance given by
E
[
U
n1n2
]
=
1
2
, Var
[
U
n1n2
]
=
n1 + n2
12n1n2
. (14)
It is worth to stress that FX(x) = FY (x) implies P(X ≤ Y ) = 0.5 (i.e., it is not true that Y is better
than X) but not vice versa. Thus, the MWW test cannot be used in general as a test for P(X ≤Y ).
This limitation of the test is due to the choice of the U statistic as estimator and the need of any
frequentist method to specify the distribution of the statistic under the null hypothesis. The
null hypothesis FX(x) = FY (x) is thus selected to be able to compute the distribution of the
statistic, although, in practice, one is interested in a much weaker hypothesis to test P(X ≤ Y )
(see Fay and Proschan (2010) for a detailed discussion). To overcome this issue of the MWW
test, it is often common to assume a location-shift model, which states that the two populations
can only differ in locations: FY (y) = FX(y− ∆). The goal is then to test the hypothesis that
there is no treatment effect ∆ = 0 (P(X ≤ Y ) = 0.5) versus the alternative ∆ > 0 (P(X ≤ Y ) >
0.5) or ∆ < 0 (P(X ≤ Y ) < 0.5). Under this assumption, the MWW test can be interpreted as
a Hodges and Lehmann (1963) estimator. On the other side, the Bayesian approach provides
the posterior distribution of P(X ≤ Y ), which can be used to compute the probability of any
hypothesis of interest. Therefore, we are not limited in the choice of the null hypothesis.
Another well-known drawback of the MWW test, which is common to all frequentist tests,
is the controversial meaning of the p-value. The Bayesian approach to decision making allows
basing the decisions on the value of the expected loss, whose practical meaning is much more
intuitive. For example, the hypothesis test:
P(X ≤ Y )≤ P(X > Y )︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(X ≤ Y )≤ 0.5 vs.
P(X ≤ Y )> P(X > Y )︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(X ≤ Y )> 0.5
can be performed in a Bayesian way in two steps. First we define a loss function
L(P,a) =
{
K0I{P(X≤Y)>0.5} if a = 0,
K1I{P(X≤Y)≤0.5} if a = 1.
(15)
The first row gives the loss we incur by taking the action a = 0 (i.e., declaring that P(X ≤ Y )≤
0.5) when actually P(X ≤ Y ) > 0.5, while the second row gives the loss we incur by taking the
action a = 1 (i.e., declaring that P(X ≤ Y ) > 0.5) when actually P(X ≤ Y ) ≤ 0.5. Second, we
compute the expected value of this loss:
E [L(P,a)] =
{
K0P [P(X ≤ Y )> 0.5] if a = 0,
K1P [P(X ≤ Y )≤ 0.5] if a = 1, (16)
where we have used the calligraphic letter P to denote the probability w.r.t. the DPs FX and FY .
Thus, we choose a = 1 if
K1P [P(X ≤ Y )≤ 0.5]≤ K0P [P(X ≤ Y )> 0.5]⇒P [P(X ≤ Y )> 0.5]> K1K1 +K0 , (17)
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or a = 0 otherwise. When the above inequality is satisfied, we can declare that P(X ≤ Y )> 0.5
with probability K1K1+K0 = 1− γ (e.g., 1− γ = 0.95).
Finally, based on the imprecise DP model developed in this paper, we can perform a
Bayesian nonparametric test that, besides overcoming the limitation of the frequentist one, is
based on extremely weak prior assumptions, and easy to elicit, since it requires only to choose
the strength s of the DP instead of its infinite-dimensional parameter α . When using the IDP set
of priors, we consider for FX and FY all the possible DP priors with strength lower than or equal
to s (since all inferences obtained for s′ < s are encompassed by those obtained for s). All these
priors give a posterior probability P [P(X ≤ Y )> 0.5] included between the lower and upper
bounds P [P(X ≤ Y )> 0.5] and P [P(X ≤ Y )> 0.5]. Thus, according to the decision rule in
(17) for some γ = K0K0+K1 , we verify if
P
[
P(X ≤ Y )> 0.5|Xn1 ,Y n2]> 1− γ, P[P(X ≤ Y )> 0.5|Xn1 ,Y n2]> 1− γ,
and then:
1. if both the inequalities are satisfied we can declare that P(X ≤ Y ) is greater than 0.5 with
probability larger than 1− γ;
2. if only one of the inequality is satisfied (which has necessarily to be the one for the upper),
we are in an indeterminate situation, i.e., we cannot decide;
3. if both are not satisfied, we can declare that the probability that P(X ≤ Y ) is greater than
0.5 is lower than the desired probability of 1− γ .
When our model of prior ignorance returns an indeterminate decision, it means that the evidence
from the observations is not enough to declare either that the probability of the hypothesis being
true is larger or smaller than the desired value 1− γ; more measurements are necessary to take a
decision.
The three cases are respectively depicted in Figure 1. Observe that the posterior distribu-
tions of P(X ≤Y ), from which the lower and upper probabilities above are derived, give us much
more information than the simple result of the hypothesis test. In particular we can derive the
posterior lower and upper probabilities of P(X ≤ Y ) < 0.5. For instance, from Figure 1 (d) we
can see that Y is not greater than X at 95%, but it is evident that X is greater than Y at 95%.
While in the case shown in Figure 1 (b), we can say neither that Y is greater than X nor that
X is greater than Y . (To distinguish these two cases it would be more appropriate to perform a
“two-sided” hypothesis test.)
In the next section we prove that the IDP is a model of prior ignorance for P(X ≤ Y ) and
derive the posterior results which are necessary to evaluate P [P(X ≤ Y )> 0.5] and perform the
test. Note that, for the moment, we assume that there are not ties between X and Y ; we will
discuss how to account for the presence of ties in Section 4.3.
4.1. IDP model for P(X ≤ Y )
Let the samples Xn1 and Y n2 be drawn, respectively, from FX and FY . As prior for (FX ,FY ),
we assume that FX ∼ Dp(s1,G1) and FY ∼ Dp(s2,G2). Hereafter, to simplify the presentation,
we take s1 = s2 = s. FX and FY are assumed to be independent. The probability P(X ≤Y ) is given
by P(X ≤Y ) = E[I[X ,∞)(Y )] =
∫
FX(y)dFY (y). As derived by Ferguson (1973), by the properties
of the Dirichlet process, it follows that a-priori E [P(X ≤ Y )] = ∫ G1(y)dG2(y). It can be shown
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(a) “Y is greater than X” at 95% (b) “Indeterminate” at 95%
(c) “Y is not greater than X” at 95% (d) “Y is not greater than X” at 95%
Figure 1: Four possible results of the hypothesis test. The dark and light filled areas correspond respectively to the lower
and upper probabilities of the event P(X ≤ Y ) > 0.5. The numerical values of these lower and upper probabilities are
also reported in the figures.
that the set of priors T in (8) satisfies the condition of prior ignorance also for P(X ≤ Y ). In
fact, since E [P(X ≤ Y )] = ∫ G1(y)dG2(y), if Gi ∈ P, we have that
E [P(X ≤ Y )] = 0, E [P(X ≤ Y )] = 1,
where the lower (upper) bound is obtained for dG1 = δX0 and dG2 = δY0 with X0 >Y0 (X0 <Y0).
Thus, prior ignorance about the mean of P(X ≤ Y ) is satisfied. Furthermore, let us consider the
probability of P(X ≤Y )< 0.5 with respect to the Dirichlet process. A-priori, for dG1 = δX0 and
dG2 = δY0 we have that
if X0 < Y0, then P[P(X ≤ Y ) = 1] = 1 and thus P[P(X ≤ Y )≤ 0.5] = 0
if X0 > Y0, then P[P(X ≤ Y ) = 0] = 1 and thus P[P(X ≤ Y )≤ 0.5] = 1.
A similar reasoning leads to P[P(X ≤ Y ) > 0.5] = 0, P[P(X ≤ Y ) > 0.5] = 1, thus, prior
ignorance about the hypothesis P(X ≤ Y ) > 0.5 is also satisfied. Given the two sequences of
measurements, a-posteriori one has:
E [P(X ≤Y )|Xn1 ,Y n2 ] =
∫
Gn1(y)dGn2(y),
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with Gni = ss+ni Gi +
1
s+ni
∑nij=1 I[Z j ,∞), where Z j = X j for i = 1 and Z j = Yj for i = 2. It follows
that:
E [P(X ≤Y )|Xn1 ,Y n2 ] = s
s+n1
s
s+n2
∫
G1(y)dG2(y)+ n1s+n1
s
s+n2
1
n1
n1
∑
j=1
(1−G2(X−j ))
+ s
s+n1
n2
s+n2
1
n2
n2∑
j=1
G1(Yj)+ n1s+n1
n2
s+n2
U
n1n2
,
(18)
where 1−G2(X−) =
∫
I[X ,∞)dG2. Then, the lower and upper posterior bounds of the posterior
expectations of P(X ≤ Y ) given the set of priors T are:
E [P(X ≤ Y )|Xn1 ,Y n2 ] = U
(s+n1)(s+n2)
,
E [P(X ≤ Y )|Xn1 ,Y n2 ] = U
(s+n1)(s+n2)
+ s(s+n1+n2)
(s+n1)(s+n2)
,
(19)
obtained in correspondence of the extreme distributions dG1 → δX0 , dG2 → δY0 , with X0 >
max({Y0, . . . ,Yn1}), Y0 < min({X0, . . . ,Xn2}) (lower) and X0 < min({Y0, . . . ,Yn1}),
Y0 > max({X0, . . . ,Xn2}) (upper). The posterior probability distribution of P(X ≤ Y ) w.r.t. the
Dirichlet process, which is used to perform the Bayesian test of the difference between the
two populations, is, in general, computed numerically (Monte Carlo sampling) by using the
stick-breaking construction of the Dirichlet process. We will show in the remaining part of this
section that, in correspondence of the discrete priors that give the upper and lower bounds of
the posterior distributions of P(X ≤Y ), a more efficient procedure can be devised. Consider the
limiting posteriors that give the posterior lower and upper expectations in (19):
Gni(y) =
s
s+ ni
I[Z0,∞)+
1
s+ ni
ni∑
j=1
I[Z j ,∞), (20)
where the lower is obtain with Z0 =X0 >max({Y0, . . . ,Yn1}) for i= 1 and Z0 =Y0 <min({X0, . . . ,Xn2})
for i= 2, and the upper with Z0 =X0 >max({Y0, . . . ,Yn1}) for i= 1, and Z0 =Y0 <min({X0, . . . ,Xn2})
for i = 2.
Lemma 1. A sample Fni from the Dirichlet process Dp(s,Gni) with base probability distribution
Gni as that defined in (20) is given by:
Fni = wi0I[Z0,∞)+
ni∑
j=1
wi jI[Z j ,∞), (21)
where (wi0,wi1, . . . ,wini)∼ Dir(s,
ni︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . ,1).
Since Gni is a discrete measure, Lemma 1 states that any distribution Fni sampled from
DP(s+ ni,Gni) has the form (21). Since the probability density functions relative to Fni , i.e.,
wi0δZ0 +
ni
∑
j=1
wi jδZ j , has a discrete support, we do not need stick-breaking. In fact, once we
have selected the support Z0,Z1, . . . ,Zni , samples Fni can simply be obtained by sampling the
weights from the Dirichlet distribution. Using this fact, we can derive lower and upper bounds
for P
[
P(X ≤ Y )> c|Xn1 ,Y n2] as follows.
Theorem 3. For any c ∈ [0,1], it holds that
P
[
P(X ≤ Y )> c|Xn1 ,Y n2]= P [g(w1·,w2·,Xn1 ,Y n2)> c] , (22)
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with
g(w1·,w2·,Xn1 ,Y n2) =
n1∑
j=1
n2∑
k=1
w1 jw2kI(X j ,∞)(Yk)
where (wi0,wi1, . . . ,wini) ∼ Dir(s,
ni︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . ,1) for i = 1,2 and P is computed w.r.t. these Dirichlet
distributions. The mean and variance of g(w1·,w2·,Xn1 ,Y n2) are:
µ = EW [W ]T AEV [V ], σ2 = trace[AT EW [WW T ]AEV [VV T ]]− µ2, (23)
where the expectations EW ,EV are taken w.r.t. the Dirichlet distributions, with W = [w11, . . . ,w1n1 ]T ,
V = [w21, . . . ,w2n2 ]T , E[WW T ] and E[VV T ] are ni × ni square-matrix of elements e jk = (s+
ni)
−1(s + ni + 1)−1(1+ I{ j}(k)) (i = 1 and 2, respectively), and A is an n1 × n2 matrix with
elements a jk = I(X j ,∞)(Yk).
Corollary 1. For any c ∈ [0,1], it holds that
P
[
P(X ≤ Y )> c|Xn1 ,Y n2]= P [g(w1·,w2·,Xn1 ,Y n2)> c] , (24)
with
g(w1·,w2·,Xn1 ,Y n2) = w10w20 +w10
n2∑
j=1
w2 j +w20
n1∑
j=1
w1 j +
n1∑
j=1
n2∑
k=1
w1 jw2kI(X j ,∞)(Yk),
where (wi0,wi1, . . . ,wini) ∼ Dir(s,
ni︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . ,1) for i = 1,2. Consider the augmented vectors W =
[w10,w11, . . . ,w1n1 ]
T
, V = [w20,w21, . . . ,w2n2 ]T , and the matrix A with elements a jk = I(X j−1,∞)(Yk−1)
for all j,k 6= 1 and a jk = 1 if j = 1 or k = 1. The mean and variance of g(w1·,w2·,Xn1 ,Y n2) can
be computed using the same formulas as in (23), where, this time, E[WW T ] and E[VV T ] are
(ni + 1)× (ni + 1) square-matrices (i = 1 and 2, respectively) of elements e jk = (s+ ni)−1(s+
ni + 1)−1e˜ jk with e˜ jk = (1+ I{ j}(k)) for all j,k 6= 1 and e˜ jk = s(1+ sδ jk) if j = 1 or k = 1.
To perform the hypothesis test, we select c = 1/2 and, according to the decision rule (17)
for some K0, K1, we check if
P
[
P(X ≤ Y )> 12 |Xn1 ,Y n2
]
> 1− γ, P[P(X ≤ Y )> 12 |Xn1 ,Y n2]> 1− γ,
where γ = K0K0+K1 ∈ (0,1) (e.g., 1− γ = 0.95).
4.2. Choice of the prior strength s
The value of s determines how quickly lower and upper posterior expectations converge at
the increase of the number of observations. A way to select a value of s is by imposing that the
degree of robustness (indeterminacy) E [P(X ≤ Y )|Xn1 ,Y n2 ]−E [P(X ≤ Y )|Xn1 ,Y n2 ] is reduced
to a fraction of its prior value (E [P(X ≤ Y )]−E [P(X ≤ Y )] = 1) after one observation (X1,Y1).
Imposing a degree of imprecision close to 1 after the first observation increases the probability
of an indeterminate outcome of the test, whereas, a value close to 0 makes the test less reliable
(in fact the limiting value of 0 corresponds to the BB which will be shown in Section 6 to be
less reliable than the IDP). Then, the intermediate value of 1/2 is a frequent choice in prior-
ignorance modeling (Pericchi and Walley, 1991; Walley, 1996). Although this is a subjective
way to choose the degree of conservativeness (indeterminacy), we will show in Section 6 that it
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represents a reasonable trade-off between the reliability and indeterminacy of the decision. From
(19) for n1 = n2 = 1, it follows that
E [P(X ≤ Y )|X1,Y1]−E [P(X ≤ Y )|X1,Y1] = s2+2s(s+1)2 .
Thus, by imposing that,
s2 + 2s
(s+ 1)2
=
1
2
,
we obtain s=
√
2−1. Observe that the lower and upper probabilities produced by a value of s are
always contained in the probability intervals produced by the larger value of s. Then, whenever
we are undecided for s1 we are also for s2 > s1. Nonetheless, for large n the distance between
the upper and lower probabilities goes to 0, then also the indeterminateness goes to zero.
4.3. Managing ties
To account for the presence of ties between samples from the two populations (Xi = Yj),
the common approach is to test the hypothesis [P(X < Y )+ 12 P(X = Y )] ≤ 0.5 against [P(X <
Y )+ 12 P(X =Y )]> 0.5. Since
P(X < Y )+
1
2
P(X = Y ) = E
[
I(X ,∞)(Y )+ 12 I{X}(Y )
]
= E[H(Y −X)],
where H(·) denotes the Heaviside step function, i.e., H(z) = 1 for z > 0, H(z) = 0.5 for z = 0
and H(z) = 0 for z < 0, in case of ties the U statistic becomes
U =
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
H(Yj−Xi), (25)
and it represents the number of pairs (Xi,Yj) for which Xi < Yj plus half of the number of pairs
(Xi,Yj) for which Xi = Yj. The results presented in Section 4 are still valid if we substitute
I(X j ,∞)(Yk) with H(Yk−X j) in matrix A.
5. Asymptotic consistency
From the expression of the lower and upper means in (19), it can be verified that for n1,n2 →
∞:
E [P(X ≤ Y )|Xn1 ,Y n2 ],E [P(X ≤Y )|Xn1 ,Y n2 ]∼ E [P(X ≤ Y )|Xn1 ,Y n2 ]∼ U
n1n2
.
Notice that in this section the symbol ∼ will be used to indicate asymptotic equivalence. The
imprecision (degree of robustness) goes to zero for n1,n2 → ∞ and the expectation E [P(X ≤
Y )|Xn1 ,Y n2 ] is asymptotically equivalent to the Mann-Whitney statistic (Ferguson, 1973). The
consistency of the IDP rank-sum test can be verified by considering the asymptotic behavior
of the posterior lower and upper distributions of P(X ≤ Y ) and compare it to the asymptotic
distribution of the statistic U/n1n2. For ease of presentation, we limit ourselves to the case n1 =
n2 = n. In Lehmann and D’Abrera (1975, Appendix A.5) it is proved that U/n1n2 converges for
n1,n2 → ∞ to a normal with mean E[Ui j] = P(X ≤ Y ) and variance
1
n
Cov[Ui j,Ui,k 6= j]+
1
n
Cov[Ui j,Uk 6=i, j], (26)
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where Urt = I(Xr,∞)(Yt) . In the following theorem an equivalent result is proved for the lower
distribution of P(X ≤ Y ) in the IDP rank-sum test
Theorem 4. Assume that n1 = n2 = n, for n → ∞ the IDP rank-sum test lower distribution
converges to a normal with mean E[Ui j] = P(X ≤ Y ) and variance given by Equation (26).
The above proof can be easily generalized to the upper distribution (the terms due to w10
and w20 vanish asymptotically) and to the case n1 6= n2 (following the same procedure as in
Lehmann and D’Abrera (1975, Th. 9)). Theorem 4 proves that the (upper and lower) distribution
of the IDP rank-sum test is asymptotically equivalent to the distribution of the statistic U/n1n2
and, thus, the IDP rank-sum test is consistent as a test for P(X ≤ Y ). Conversely, the MWW
test is only consistent in the case P(X ≤Y ) = 0.5 and FX = FY or P(X ≤ Y ) 6= 0.5 and FX 6= FY ,
while it is not consistent for P(X ≤ Y ) = 0.5 and FX 6= FY . For instance if X ∼ N(0,1) and
Y ∼N(0,σ2) with σ2 > 1, two Normal distributions with different variance, then P(X ≤Y )= 0.5
but the distributions are different. In this case, if we apply MWW test with a significance level
γ = 0.05, MWW will return the alternative hypothesis in approximatively 8.7% of the cases (for
a large σ2), see DasGupta (2008, Sec. 25.5). This means that MWW is not calibrated as a test
for P(X ≤ Y ) = 0.5 and it is not powerful as a test for FX(x) 6= FY (x). Conversely, because of
Theorem 4, our IDP test with γ = 0.05 will return the alternative hypothesis (asymptotically) in
5% of the cases, which is correct since P(X ≤ Y ) = 0.5.
6. Numerical simulations
Consider a Monte Carlo experiment in which n1, n2 observations X ,Y are generated based
on
X ∼ N(0,1), Y ∼ N(∆,1),
with ∆ ranging from −1.5 to 1.5. To facilitate the comparison of IDP tests with more traditional
tests (which never issue indeterminate outcomes) we introduce a new test (called “50/50 when
indeterminate”) which returns the same response as the IDP when this is determinate, and issues
a random answer (with 50/50 chance) otherwise. We want to stress that the test “50/50 when
indeterminate” has been introduced only for the sake of comparison. We are not suggesting
that when the IDP is indeterminate we should toss a coin to take the decision. On the contrary
we claim that the indeterminacy of the IDP is an additional useful information that our approach
gives to the analyst. In these cases she/he knows that (i) her/his posterior decisions would depend
on the choice of the prior G0; (ii) deciding between the two hypotheses under test is a difficult
problem as shown by the comparison with the Bayesian Bootstrap DP (BB-DP) rank-sum test
(s = 0) and MWW tests. Based on this additional information, the analyst can for example
decide to collect additional measurements to eliminate the indeterminacy (in fact we have seen
that when the number of observations goes to infinity the indeterminacy goes to zero).
We start by comparing the performance of the BB-DP and IDP tests. To evaluate the per-
formance of the tests, we have used the loss function defined in (15). In particular, for each
value of ∆ we have performed 20000 Monte Carlo runs by generating in each run n1 = n2 = 20
observations for X ,Y . The average loss for the cases (i) K1 = K2 = 1 (i.e., γ = 0.5) (ii) K1 = 1
and K2 = 9 (i.e., γ = 0.1) and (iii) K1 = 1 and K2 = 19 (i.e., γ = 0.05) is shown in Figure 2 as a
function of ∆. In particular, we report (i) the loss of the BB-DP test; (ii) the loss of the IDP test
when it is determinate; (iii) the indeterminacy of the IDP test, i.e., the number of times it returns
an indeterminate response divided by the total number of Monte Carlo runs; (iv) the loss of the
“50/50 when indeterminate” test.
16
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
∆
Lo
ss
 
 
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
∆
Lo
ss
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
∆
Lo
ss
s=0 IP−Dp determinate 50/50 when indeterminate IP−Dp indeterminacy
Figure 2: Loss as a function of ∆ for the case K0 = K1 = 1 (left), K0 = 1,K1 = 9 (center) and K0 = 1,K1 = 19 (right).
From Figure 2, it is evident that the performance of the BB-DP and 50/50 tests practically
coincide. Furthermore, since we noticed from experimental evidence that in all cases in which
BB-DP is determinate, BB-DP returns the same response as IDP, the difference between the
two tests is only in the runs where the IDP is indeterminate. In these runs, BB-DP is clearly
guessing at random, since overall it has the same accuracy as the 50/50 test. Therefore, the
IDP is able to isolate several instances in which BB-DP is guessing at random, thus providing
useful information to the analyst. Assume, for instance, that we are trying to compare the effects
of two medical treatments (“Y is better than X”) and that, given the available data, the IDP is
indeterminate. In such situation the BB-DP test always issues a determinate response (I can tell
if “Y is better than X”), but it turns out that its response is virtually random (like if we were
tossing a coin). On the other side, the IDP acknowledges the impossibility of making a decision
and thus, although BB-DP and the IDP (more precisely the “50/50 when indeterminate” test)
have the same accuracy, the IDP provides more information. Note that, in all the cases the
maximum percentage of runs in which the IDP is indeterminate is about 18%; this means that
BB-DP is issuing a random answer in 18% of the cases, which is a large percentage. For large
|∆|, i.e. when the hypothesis test is easy, there are not indeterminate instances and both the BB-
DP and the IDP tests have zero loss. It is interesting to note that, for the cases K1 = 1 and K2 = 9
(or K2 = 19) (Figure 2 center and right) it is more risky (we may incur a greater loss) taking the
action a = 1 than a = 0, and thus the indeterminacy curve is shifted to the ∆ > 0 quadrant.
We have also compared the IDP test and the one-sided MWW null hypothesis significance
test (NHST) implemented according to the conventional decision criterion, p < 0.05. It is well
known that the decision process in NHST is flawed. It is based on asking what is the probability
of the data statistic if the null hypothesis were true. This means that NHST can only reject the
null hypothesis (∆ ≤ 0), contrarily to a Bayesian analysis that can also accept this hypothesis.
Furthermore, in a Bayesian analysis we have a principled way to determine γ (i.e., by means
of a loss function) which is lost when putting decisions in the format p < 0.05 (or the more
vague p < 0.1). Because of these differences, it is difficult to compare the Bayesian with the
NHST approach, where we do not have a clear interpretation of the significance level. However,
we believe a relatively fair comparison can be carried out by setting γ equal to the significance
level of the NHST test, so that the decision criteria adopted by the two test are as similar as
possible. Figure 3 shows the power for the case γ = 0.05, n1 = n2 = 10 and n1 = n2 = 20. In
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Figure 3: Power as a function of the difference of the medians ∆ for the case n1 = n2 = 10 (left) and n1 = n2 = 20 (right)
with γ = 0.05.
case n1 = n2 = 20 (Figure 3, right) it is evident that the performance of the MWW and 50/50 tests
practically coincide. Since it can be verified experimentally that when the IDP is determinate
the two tests return the same results, this again suggests that when the IDP is indeterminate we
have equal probability that p < 0.05 or p > 0.05, as it is shown in Figure 4. The IDP test is able
to isolate some instances in which also the MWW test is issuing a random answer. Note that, for
∆ = 0.5, the maximum percentage of runs in which the IDP test is indeterminate is large, about
18%; this means that MWW is issuing a random answer in 18% of the cases.
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Figure 4: Distribution of MWW p-values in the IDP indeterminate cases for n1 = n2 = 20, γ = 0.05 and ∆ = 0.5.
The results for the case n1 = n2 = 10 (Figure 3, left) lead to similar conclusions. The
performance of the MWW and 50/50 tests (almost) coincide. The 50/50 test is slightly better for
∆≤ 0.9 and slightly worse for ∆ > 0.9. ∆ = 0.9 is the value which corresponds to the maximum
indeterminacy of the IDP, i.e. 30%. Thus, for ∆ = 0.9, MWW is guessing at random in 30% of
the runs.
It is worth analyzing also the case ∆ = 0. We know that in this case the frequentist test
is calibrated, i.e., when γ = 0.05 the percentage of correct answers is 95% (although it can be
noticeably larger for small values of n1, n2 since the discreteness of the MWW statistic originates
a gap between the chosen γ and the actual significance of the MWW test). Table 1 shows the
accuracy for ∆ = 0. The performance of the MWW and 50/50 tests are similar also in this case.
The difference is about 1% (for n1 = n2 = 10) and 0.5% (for n1 = n2 = 20).
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Accuracy n1 = n2 = 10 Accuracy n1 = n2 = 20
MWW 0.955 0.952
50/50 test 0.945 0.947
IDP when determinate 0.911 0.924
Indeterminacy 0.068 0.045
Table 1: Accuracy for ∆ = 0 and γ = 0.05.
Accuracy γ = 0.1 Accuracy γ = 0.25
MWW 0.8995 0.7552
50/50 test 0.8993 0.7482
IDP when determinate 0.8568 0.6777
IDP indeterminacy 0.081 0.142
Table 2: Accuracy in case ∆ = 0 for n1 = n2 = 20
Also in this case, when the IDP is determinate, it returns the same responses as MWW. This
result holds independently of the choice of γ , as shown by Figure 5 and Table 2 where we have
repeated the above experiment for n1 = n2 = 20 with, this time, γ = 0.1 and γ = 0.25.
Finally, Figure 6 shows the error (one minus the accuracy) of the IDP test as a function
of s, when γ = 0.1, n1 = n2 = 20 and ∆ = 0. Clearly, the error of the MWW test is constantly
equal to γ = 0.1 (we are under the null hypothesis of MWW). The error of the IDP test when
determinate decreases with s, because of the increase of the indeterminacy. The error of the
50/50 test has a convex trend, clearly decreasing for s < 0.2 and increasing for s > 0.5. This
(together with the other results of this section) may be seen as an empirical confirmation that the
choice of s =
√
2−1 is appropriate, since it guarantees a good trade-off between robustness and
indeterminacy.
Finally observe that all the above differences/similarities between the three tests appear also
in the case we consider location-shift models with distributions different from Gaussians (e.g.,
Student-t distribution). These results have been omitted for shortness.
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Figure 5: Power as a function of the difference of the medians ∆ for n1 = n2 = 20, γ = 0.1 (left) and γ = 0.25 (right).
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Figure 6: Error as a function of s for n1 = n2 = 20, γ = 0.1 and ∆ = 0.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a model of prior ignorance for nonparametric inference
based on the Dirichlet process (DP), by extending the approach proposed by Pericchi and Walley
(1991) and based on the use of sets of prior distributions. We developed a prior near-ignorance
DP model (IDP) for inference about a variable X by fixing the prior strength of the DP and
letting the normalized probability measure vary in the set of all distributions. We have proved
that the IDP is consistent and a-priori vacuous for all predictive inferences that can be defined
as the expectation of a real-valued bounded function of X . The proposed IDP model has two
main merits. First, it removes the need for specifying the infinite-dimensional parameter of the
DP (only an upper bound for the strength s of the DP must be assumed a-priori), thus making
the elicitation of the prior very easy. Second, it allows computing the posterior inferences for
which no closed form expression exists, by a simple Monte Carlo sampling from the Dirichlet
distribution, thus avoiding more demanding sampling approaches typically used for the DP (e.g.,
stick breaking). Based on this new prior near-ignorance model, we have proposed a general,
simple and conservative approach to Bayesian nonparametric tests, and in particular we have
developed a robust Bayesian alternative to the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test: the IDP rank-
sum test. We have shown that our test is asymptotically consistent, while this is not always
the case for the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. Finally, by means of numerical simulations, we
have compared the IDP rank-sum test to the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test and the Bayesian test
obtained from the DP when the prior strength goes to zero. Results have shown that the IDP
test is more robust, in the sense that it is able to isolate instances in which these tests are almost
guessing at random. Given these interesting results, as future work we plan to use this approach
to implement Bayesian versions of the most used frequentist nonparametric tests. In the long
run, our aim is to build a statistical package for Bayesian nonparametric tests.
8. Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: From (2) assuming that P∼Dp(s,α∗) one has that E [E( f )] = ∫ f dα∗.
Define xl = arginfx∈X f (x) and xu = argsupx∈X f (x), then (9) follows by:
E [E( f )] = inf
α∗∈P
∫
f dα∗ =
∫
f dδxl = f (xl), E [E( f )] = sup
α∗∈P
∫
f dα∗ =
∫
f dδxu = f (xu),
20
which are the infimum and supremum of f by definition. The lower and upper bounds are thus
obtained by the following degenerate DPs Dp(s,δxl ) and Dp(s,δxu), which belong to the class
(8). In case xl is equal to ∞ (or −∞), with f (xl) we mean limxl→∞ f (xl), similar for the upper.
Proof of Theorem 2: By exploiting the fact that E [E( f )|X1, . . . ,Xn] =
∫ f d( s
s+n α
∗+ n
s+n
1
n ∑ni=1 δXi),
the proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 (the lower and upper bounds are again obtained by de-
generate DPs Dp(s,δxl ) and Dp(s,δxu)).
Proof of Lemma 1: It follows from the properties (a) and (c) of the DP in Section 2.
Proof of Theorem 3: Based on the stick-breaking construction, a sample F0 from the generic DP
Dp(s,G0) can be written as F0(x) =
∞
∑
k=1
pikδ ˜Xk where pik = βk
k−1
∏
i−1
(1− βi), βk ∼ Beta(1,s), and
Xk ∼ G0. Then, using (6), we have that
Fn(x) =
n
∑
i=1
wiδXi +w0
∞
∑
k=1
pikδ ˜Xk , (27)
where (w0,w1, . . . ,wn) ∼ Dir(s,
ni︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . ,1). Consider the two samples FX(x) and FY (y) from the
posterior distributions of X and Y given the generic DP priors Dp(s,G10) and Dp(s,G20). The
probability of P(X ≤Y )> c is P[P(X ≤Y )> c]=P[∫ Fn1(y)dFn2(y)> c]. Then, the posterior
lower probability of P(X ≤ Y ) > c is obtained by minimizing ∫ Fn1(y)dFn2(y), which, by (27),
is equal to
∫ ( n1∑
i=1
w1iI(Xi,∞)(y)+w10
∞
∑
k=1
pi1kI( ˜Xk,∞)(y)
)(
n2
∑
j=1
w2 jδYj (y)+w20
∞
∑
l=1
pi2lδ ˜Yl (y)
)
dy
=
n1
∑
i=1
n2
∑
j=1
w1iw2 jI(Xi,∞)(Y j)+w20
n1
∑
i=1
∞
∑
l=1
w1ipi2l I(Xi,∞)( ˜Yl)
+ w10
∞
∑
k=1
n2∑
j=1
pi1kw2 jI( ˜Xk,∞)(Y j)+w10w20
∞
∑
k=1
∞
∑
l=1
pi1kpi2l I( ˜Xk,∞)( ˜Yl)
(28)
The minimum of
∫
Fn1(y)dFn2(y) is always found in correspondence of prior DPs such that the
posterior probability of sampling ˜Xk <Yj, ˜Yl or ˜Yl >Xi is zero, so that only the term
n1
∑
i=1
n2
∑
j=1
w1iw2 jI(Xi,∞)(Yj)
remains in (28). Priors of such kind are, for example, the extreme DP priors that give the pos-
terior lower mean in (19) and the posterior Dirichlet process Fni with base probability Gni given
by (20). From the property of the Dirichlet distribution, we know that E[wi j] = 1/(s+ ni) and,
thus, we can rewrite the lower expectation given in the first equation of (19) as
µ =
n1∑
j=1
n2∑
k=1
1
s+ n1
1
s+ n2
I(X j ,∞)(Yk) = EW [W ]
T AEV [V ],
For the variance, we have that σ2 = E[(
n1
∑
j=1
n2
∑
k=1
w1 jw2kI(X j ,∞)(Yk))
2]−µ2. Thus, by exploiting the
equality (
n1∑
j=1
n2∑
k=1
w1 jw2kI(X j ,∞)(Yk)
)2
=W T AVW T AV =V T ATWW T AV,
the linearity of expectation and the independence of W,V , one obtains
E[V T ATWW T AV ] = EV [V T AT EW [WW T ]AV ] = EV [V T AT EW [WW T ]AV ].
21
Since the result of this product is a scalar, it is equal to its trace and thus we can use the
cyclic property trace[EV [V T AT EW [WW T ]AV ]] = trace[AT EW [WW T ]AEV [VV T ]], and finally ob-
tain σ2 = trace[AT EW [WW T ]AEV [VV T ]]−µ2. The proof is easily completed by deriving EW [WW T ]
and EV [VV T ] from the fact that wi j,wkl are independent and EW [w2i j] = 2(s+ni)(s+ni+1) , EW [wi jwil ] =
1
(s+ni)(s+ni+1) .
Proof of Corollary 1: First, observe that the posterior upper probability of P(X ≤ Y )> c is ob-
tained in correspondence of the extreme DP prior that gives the posterior upper mean in (19) and
has base probability dGni given by (20). The probability of X ≤ Y for a given realization Fn1 of
Dp(s,Gn1), and Fn2 of Dp(s,Gn2) is:
P
[
P(X ≤ Y )> c|Xn1 ,Y n2]= P [∫ Fn1(y)dFn2(y)> c
]
= P
[∫ (
w10I(X0,∞)(y)+
n1∑
j=1
w1 jI(X j ,∞)(y)
)(
w20δY0(y)+
n2∑
j=1
w2 jδYj (y)
)
dy > c
]
= P
[
w10w20 +w10
n2
∑
j=1
w2 j +w20
n1
∑
j=1
w1 j +
n1
∑
j=1
n2
∑
k=1
w1 jw2kI(X j ,∞)(Yk)> c
]
.
The computations are similar to those in Theorem 3, but in this case we must also consider
the expectations EW [w2i0] = s(s+ 1)/(s+ ni)(s+ ni + 1), EW [wi0wi j] = s/(s+ ni)(s+ ni + 1) for
j > 0.
Proof of Theorem 4: Our goal is to prove the convergence to a normal distribution of the Bayesian
bootstrapped two-sample statistic UDP = ∑
i, j
w1iw2 jI[Xi,∞)(Yj), which implies the asymptotic nor-
mality of the DP rank sum test lower distribution, since the contribution of the prior G0 van-
ishes asymptotically. The asymptotic normality of UDP can be proved by means of Lemma
6.1.3. of Lehmann (1998), which states that given a sequence of random variables Tn, the
distributions of which tend to a limit distribution L, the distribution of another sequence T ∗n
satisfying E[(T ∗n −Tn)2]→ 0 also tends to L. Said h(x,y) = I[x,∞)(y), h1(x) = EY [h(x,Y )] and
h2(y) = EX [h(X ,y)], the theorem will be proved by applying the lemma to
Tn =
√
n
[
1
n
(
n
∑
i=1
h1(Xi)−θ )+ 1
n
(
n
∑
j=1
h2(Yj)−θ )
]
and T ∗n =
√
n(UDP − θ ) where θ = E[Ui j] = E[h1(X)] = E[h2(Y )]. Tn is a sum of independent
terms and thus, from the central limit theorem, it converges to a Gaussian distribution with mean
0 and variance σ2 = σ21 +σ22 , where σ21 =Var[h1(X)] and σ22 =Var[h2(Y )]). Note that
σ21 =Cov[h(X ,Y ),h(X ,Y ′)] =Cov[Ui j,Ui,k 6= j],
σ22 =Cov[h(X ,Y ),h(X ′,Y )] =Cov[Ui j,Uk 6=i, j].
From Theorem 3, the mean of the lower distribution of UDP is µl = EW [W ]T AEV [V ] = U(s+n)2 ,
and thus, for large n, it is asymptotic to U/n2 which converges, in turn, to E[Ui j] = θ .Then, also
E[T ∗n ] = 0 so that
E[(T ∗n −Tn)2] =Var[T ∗n ]+Var[Tn]− 2Cov[T∗n ,Tn].
The proof will be completed by showing that Var[T ∗n ] → σ2 and Cov[T ∗n ,Tn] → σ2. For the
variance of UDP (23), first note that we can rewrite EW [WW T ] = EV [VV T ] = (D+Jn) 1(s+n)(s+n+1)
22
where D is the diagonal matrix of ones (identity matrix) and Jn is the n×n matrix of ones. Thus,
we have that
AT EW [WW T ]AEV [VV T ] = AT (D+ Jn)A(D+ Jn)
1
(s+ n)2(s+ n+ 1)2
,
and, for large n,
trace(AT (D+Jn)A(D+Jn))
(s+n)2(s+n+1)2 →
trace(AT A)+trace(AT AJn)+trace(AT JnA)+trace(AT JnAJn)
n2(n+1)2 .
The above sum has four terms at the numerator:
trace(AT A) = ∑i, j a2i j = ∑i, j I(Xi,∞)(Y j),
trace(AT AJn) = ∑i, j ai j ∑k aik = ∑i, j I(Xi,∞)(Y j)+∑i, j 6=k I(Xi,∞)(Y j)I(Xi,∞)(Yk),
trace(AT JnA) = ∑i, j ai j ∑k ak j = ∑i, j I(Xi,∞)(Y j)+∑i6=k, j I(Xi,∞)(Y j)I(Xk,∞)(Y j),
and trace(AT JnAJn) = trace(AT11T A11T ) = trace(1T A11T AT1) = U2, where 1 is the unit
vector. Then we have that
σ2l =
3∑i, j I2(Xi ,∞)(Yj)−3n
2µ2l
n2(n+1)2 +
∑i, j 6=k I(Xi ,∞)(Yj)I(Xi ,∞)(Yk)−n
2(n−1)µ2l
n2(n+1)2
+
∑i 6=k, j I(Xi ,∞)(Yj)I(Xk ,∞)(Yj)−n
2(n−1)µ2l
n2(n+1)2 +
3n2+2n2(n−1)+n4
n2(n+1)2 µ
2
l − µ2l .
Note that ( 3n
2+2n2(n−1)+n4
n2(n+1)2 − 1)µ2l = 0 and, since the first term in σ2l goes to zero as 1/n2, for
large n,
σ2l →
∑i, j 6=k I(Xi ,∞)(Yj)I(Xi ,∞)(Yk)−n
2(n−1)µ2l
n2(n+1)2 +
∑i 6=k, j I(Xi ,∞)(Yj)I(Xk ,∞)(Yj)−n
2(n−1)µ2l
n2(n+1)2 .
For large n, it can be shown Lehmann and D’Abrera (1975, Th. 9) that the right-hand side of
the above equations tends to 1
n
Cov[Ui j,Ui,k 6= j] + 1nCov[Ui j,Uk 6=i, j] =
1
n
σ2, and thus Var[Tn] =
Var[
√
nUDP]→ σ2. For the covariance we have
Cov[Tn,T ∗n ] =
(
E[UDP
n
∑
i=1
h1(Xi)]+E[UDP
n
∑
j=1
h2(Y j)]−2θ
)
=
(
E[∑
i, j
w1iw2 jEYj [h(Xi,Y j)]
n
∑
i=1
h1(Xi)]+E[∑
i, j
w1iw2 jEXi [h(Xi,Y j)]
n
∑
j=1
h2(Y j)]−2θ
)
=
(
EX [
n
∑
i=1
E[w1i]h1(Xi)
n
∑
i=1
h1(Xi)]+EY [
n
∑
j=1
E[w2 j]h2(Y j)
n
∑
j=1
h2(Y j)]−2θ
)
= 1n
(
(
n
∑
i=1
EX [h1(Xi))2]+(
n
∑
j=1
EY [h2(Y j))2]−2θ
)
=Var[h1(X)]+Var[h2(Y )] = σ2.
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